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Abstract 
This article examines whether anonymity online has a future. In the early days of the In-
ternet, strong cryptography, anonymous remailers, and a relative lack of surveillance cre-
ated an environment conducive to anonymous communication. Today, the outlook for 
online anonymity is poor. Several forces combine against it: ideologies that hold that ano-
nymity is dangerous, or that identifying evil-doers is more important than ensuring a safe 
mechanism for unpopular speech; the profitability of identification in commerce; govern-
ment surveillance; the influence of intellectual property interests and in requiring hard-
ware and other tools that enforce identification; and the law at both national and supra-
national levels. As a result of these forces, online anonymity is now much more difficult 
than previously, and looks to become less and less possible. Nevertheless, the ability to 
speak truly freely remains an important 'safety valve' technology for the oppressed, for 
dissidents, and for whistle-blowers. The article argues that as data collection online merg-
es with data collection offline, the ability to speak anonymously online will only become 
more valuable. Technical changes will be required if online anonymity is to remain possi-
ble. Whether these changes are possible depends on whether the public comes to appre-
ciate value the option of anonymous speech while it is still possible to engineer mecha-
nisms to permit it. 
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From Anonymity to Identification 
A. Michael Froomkin 
1 Introduction 
This is not a cheerful paper, which mirrors the lecture from which it is adapted.1 It is 
not cheerful because the prognosis for effective online anonymity has become pro-
gressively less and less cheerful. 
By anonymity, I mean something strong: the ability to speak without anybody being 
able to identify you. This untraceable anonymity is the highest level of technical pro-
tection for speech (cf. Froomkin 1995). That it is untraceable brings with it the ability 
to speak without fear of jail, harm, or other retaliation. This strong version of anonymi-
ty is controversial. The arguments for why untraceable anonymity is a good thing in-
clude the idea that it contributes to human flourishing; people want to experiment, 
and the ability to experiment with less fear contributes to human self-realization. In 
places that are less free, avoiding retribution for saying the wrong thing may be a mat-
ter of life and death. Political dissidents, ethnic minorities, religious splinter groups, 
people campaigning for women’s rights or gay rights, and many others are, or have 
been, subject to the risk of genuine and very palpable violence. If they wish to speak or 
write for their causes they need a means to protect themselves. Anonymity is one such 
tool. 
For those of us who do not face the danger of personal violence in retaliation for 
our writings, there are nonetheless other more subtle dangers. One is the danger of 
profiling. Profiling enables stereotypical discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, political opinion, or other characteristics. Less serious, but annoying, is the effort 
commercial entities make to profile for marketing purposes. 
Anonymity is a way to defend against that profiling, a protection that is desirable 
not just because some find it creepy or uncomfortable to be profiled, but also because 
the people doing the profiling could actually exercise market power by doing price dis-
crimination (DeLong et al. 2000). 
When the Internet started, one byproduct of the architecture of the Internet was 
that online anonymity was easy to achieve. It required only minimal technical 
knowledge, or fairly simple tools, or assistance from the right people. In those days you 
                                                      
1 The lecture from which this paper is adapted was delivered at the University of Heidelberg on Dec 
11, 2015, under the auspices of the Netzpolitik AG of the University of Heidelberg. I am very grateful 
to Dr. Wolf J. Schünemann and all my hosts for the invitation and the warm welcome. Unless other-
wise noted, this paper attempts to reflect legal and technical developments up to May 1, 2015. 
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could be anonymous and have a great deal of faith in being successfully untraceable. 
Cryptography made this possible. PGP – "Pretty Good Privacy" – was one of the early 
and important tools, perhaps the first consumer-oriented cryptography. Another very 
important tool was the secure anonymous remailer (cf. Froomkin 1997: 129). 
An anonymous remailer works as follows: Alice sends out an email destined for Bob 
which contains within it one or more layers. Each layer consists of an encrypted mes-
sage, which I will call the payload, and unencrypted delivery instructions, making the 
entire message something like a sealed paper letter with an address written on the 
front. Although destined for Bob, Alice addresses the message to a remailer operator. 
The remailer operator strips off the headers of Alice's email – the part that identified it 
as coming from her – and forwards the payload message as directed. Alice could direct 
that the payload go to a second remailer, who would decrypt the payload only to find 
in it another layer of address and (to him) unreadable payload. By chaining the mes-
sage in this manner through two or more remailers, Alice could ensure that before the 
message reached Bob its origins would be thoroughly obfuscated. What is more, if Al-
ice and Bob used encryption to exchange messages, then none of the remailer opera-
tors would ever know what Alice was saying. Even if Bob was not so sophisticated, only 
the last remailer in the chain would be capable of reading the cleartext, and that per-
son would have no way of finding out who originally sent the message unless every 
remailer in the chain kept logs and cooperated in unraveling the message's path. 
Sending messages this way was never easy, and would be harder today because 
there are fewer reliable remailers. Remailers ran into two serious problems. The first is 
that spammers abused the remailer network. Strangely, a small amount of spam is a 
good thing for the remailer network because the spammers can be relied on to create 
a certain volume of traffic and this makes it harder for any observer to trace the genu-
ine messages as they move through the network (ib.). But in short order the volume of 
spam increased to the point that so much spam went through the network as to first 
burden it and then choke many of the remailers entirely (Canter 2003). 
Worse, the remailers faced a serious legal problem. The end point in any chain of 
remailers – the exit node – carries legal risk for misuse of the network. If, for example, 
your computer was used to send a death threat to the US President, ignorance of the 
message's content was not a comforting defense, and certainly was no shield against 
an investigation. To say that the entire process was automated did not necessarily pro-
vide a sufficient defense either.2 As governments and police departments became 
more technologically savvy, the email operators increasingly decided it was just too 
unsafe to run a remailer, or at least to run an exit node. As fewer and fewer remailers 
were willing to be exits, the ones that persisted became overwhelmed with all the 
                                                      
2 Notably, the protections of the CDA against civil liability for third-party postings do not apply to 
criminal law. 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(1). 
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spam that sought release into the greater Internet, thus accelerating the network's 
death spiral. 
Almost all these anonymity systems depended on some kind of cryptography. 
Western governments, and in particular the U.S. government, worked very hard to 
slow the spread of consumer cryptography. Governments were basically able to re-
strict the spread of cryptography, originally through export control (Froomkin 1996: 
15–75). By preventing standardization, they made it easier to maintain the wiretapping 
and interception capabilities of both national security services and ordinary law en-
forcement. For many years this project of prevention was successful, and consumer 
cryptography was rare; indeed, only specialists used it – the presence of strongly en-
crypted traffic was sufficiently unusual to raise the possibility that observers might use 
it as a signal that one had something to hide, drawing extra attention from the authori-
ties. 
All these things undermine access to anonymity (in the strong sense). We can di-
vide the history of Internet communications into three periods when using anonymity 
as a yardstick. In the first period, as noted above, anonymity was easy if you knew 
what you were doing, but it was not available easily to the consumer. This period end-
ed when the remailers died off and strong anonymity was reduced to what I would call 
a 'safety valve' technology. That is, although it was no longer as easy for the technolog-
ically adept to achieve strong anonymity, it was still technically feasible. That mat-
tered: if you were, for example, a sufficiently motivated dissident organization – you 
could be anonymous if you had to be. But for most people anonymity was either not 
available at all or it was foreseeably traceable: it was predictable that governments or 
others could trace the author without extraordinary effort. Today, anonymity online is 
not even a safety valve: it is increasingly difficult, sometimes impossible, for everyone. 
2 The source of the demise of anonymity 
Today the outlook for online anonymity is much worse than it has ever been before, 
and there is, I fear, little hope for improvement. The sources of this change extend well 
beyond the government surveillance revealed in the Snowden revelations (Strohm et 
al. 2014; Greenwald 2013; Kelion 2013; ib. 2014; Gellman 2013; Ball 2014; cf. Ball et al. 
2013). There are in fact five reasons for this development. First, there is a widespread 
ideology that says anonymity is a bad thing in itself and ought not to be allowed. A 
second source is the profit motive. It turns out that there is quite a lot of profit in not 
having anonymity. The next two things are technological. Both governments and the 
private sector built a series of tools that greatly improve their abilities to track users 
online. These technologies are synergistic with other tools that enhance the linkages 
between online and off-line tracking. Off-line tracking is already prevalent and still 
growing, which means that it is ever harder to be anonymous online. Where in the 
past we observed the online world intruding into, and altering, the real world, now we 
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see the reverse: the real world invades and affects the online. And last – because it 
was somewhat late to the party – is the law, both at the national and the supra-
national level. 
Powerful motives animate the effort to make anonymity traceable, or indeed im-
possible. The most visible of these motives is the felt needs of national security, an 
argument pressed with increasing energy since 9/11. This concern over security is 
fueled by the fear that bad actors are using (or will use) this technology to inspire oth-
ers to do harmful things, and that it empowers communications among terrorists who 
will be working in secret. The spies and policeman, it is claimed, will be left defense-
less. 
It is easy to imagine the anonymity issue from the point of view of a government 
official. A reasonable official might well believe that if she refrained from deploying 
some available technology of surveillance, and then something terrible happened, eve-
rybody would blame her. This scenario is what many officials actually believe, and this 
belief therefore pushes the people in government towards ever-increasing surveillance 
(Baker 2010: 5, 72). 
This tendency in government, to push for technologies of identification in fear of 
not being able to catch someone doing something bad, is a truly global phenomenon. 
It is found in the UK (c.f. UK Identity Cards Act 2006: c.15), Australia (Parliament of 
Australia 2015), and in Pakistan (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board 
1996: 438). Iran recently announced mandatory identification for everybody who goes 
online – as soon as they can figure out how to do it (The Economic Times 2011; Sharma 
2011). India has been monitoring electronic communications for many years. It has a 
very elaborate and expensive centralized monitoring system, aimed at the Internet, 
called the “Lawful Intercept and Monitoring System” (Singh 2013). 
The Indian story is instructive as it shows some of the limits of the law as a tool for 
combatting even government surveillance. Indian courts said that the Indian govern-
ment needed a warrant to access email and telephonic communications (Prakash 
2013). As a condition of receiving a license to operate, all internet service providers 
(ISPs), and all telecom providers, are required to provide the Indian government direct 
access to all communications passing through their systems, and must do so without a 
warrant (Freedom House 2014). India also requires that the carriers make sure that 
only weak encryption is used with their equipment in order to ensure that everything 
they carry is very easily accessible to authorities (Verma 2015). Furthermore, privacy 
safeguards built into the “Lawful Intercept and Monitoring System” appear to be ig-
nored (Singh 2013). 
Some other countries are not spending quite as much money as India and are not 
quite as strong in their licensing requirements, but they are enforcing identification 
nonetheless. In many countries, a major method of access to Internet is through cyber 
cafés. To destroy anonymity, governments pass a law that says cyber cafés must ask 
for ID and keep a log of who is using which machine at what time. This creates a record 
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that the government can always access if it traces a message's IP number to a particu-
lar machine in a cybercafé, thus allowing it to link the message to a person. 
In the United States, the view that anonymity is dangerous is associated with Jus-
tice Scalia of our Supreme Court, who wrote in a 1995 dissent that anonymity is gener-
ally dishonorable because "[i]t facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is 
ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity" (McIntyre 1994: 514 U.S. 334, 385). To 
create legal protection for anonymous communication absent a reason to expect 
"threats, harassment, or reprisals," he argued, "seems to me a distortion of the past 
that will lead to a coarsening of the future" (ib.: 334, 385). However, in the McIntyre 
case as well as in other recent decisions (cf. Watchower Bible 2001: 536 U.S. 150, 166), 
the Supreme Court has found that there is a right to anonymous speech in the US Con-
stitution. That means US citizens and permanent residents are protected against US 
laws criminalizing or otherwise preventing anonymous speech. We are not protected 
against government actions that have the side effect of making anonymous speech 
impossible nor against anonymity-blocking actions in the private sector. Thus, although 
we have a constitutional right, it turns out not to be as meaningful as it probably 
sounds. 
In other countries, such as the UK, identification is incentivized by liability rules. 
The UK Defamation Act 2013 amended the UK's libel laws to stop the problem of peo-
ple going to the UK and suing for Internet speech that originated somewhere else. The 
new Act provides that it is a defense for a website operator to show that she was not 
the author of the challenged material, but only if the identity of the real author is read-
ily apparent, or if the website operator has complied with regulations concerning how 
to respond to notices of alleged defamation (Defamation Act, 2013: c. 26 U.K.). This 
puts pressure on the website owner. If the website owner cannot identify the speaker, 
then she has 48 hours following notice of the libel claim to take down the post or the 
speech is treated as her own (ib.). The United States, of course, is at the other ex-
treme. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes the owner of the 
website for almost all hosted third party speech unless the plaintiff can show that the 
website owner said it himself. Most other countries do not take that view, and a web-
site operator is responsible for policing whatever speech appears there. 
The United States, and other countries, also adhere to another important ideologi-
cal view that has worked against anonymity, an ideology of responsibility that is rooted 
in feminist ideas. Numbers of feminists, including one of my colleagues (Franks 2011: 
224–261; ib. 2012: 655–704), think it is tremendously important to punish people 
harming women online. Feminists point to “revenge porn,” the posting of nude pic-
tures of ex-girlfriends as a form of oppression that they want to eliminate, and have 
ignited a movement sweeping the US to require website operators either to identify 
the source of the picture or be held responsible for it themselves (Peterson 2015). The 
consequences for anonymity are obvious. If you are creating a website capable of host-
ing photographs posted by others, you cannot know in advance what sort of photo-
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graphs will be posted there. Therefore, under this regime, you have to be able to find 
everybody who uses your website for fear they might post one of these pictures. 
3 The technological drivers of the demise of anonymity 
Other technologies neither give people notice nor a choice as to how they will be iden-
tified. “Trusted computing” is a set of technologies designed to serve the needs of digi-
tal rights management (DRM). The theory is that users cannot be trusted, and hence 
content providers need to know exactly who is accessing their content. Manufacturers 
put an identification chip into a device, and design the operating system to allow third 
parties to see the ID, but prevent the device’s owner from masking the ID (Woodford 
2004: 253–280). Content providers love this, as it permits them to append a unique 
identifier to every licensed download that encodes the user’s ID without the machine 
owner’s knowledge. That way, if a digital copy of the content should turn up on some-
body else’s machine, the rights-owners will know who to sue. 
The protection of intellectual property rights is a globally accepted norm. The prob-
lem with ‘trusted computing’, however, is that the same technology that enables 
strong DRM can easily be accessed by other applications designed to identify the user. 
The fundamental design feature of ‘trusted computing’ is that the user can have no 
control over it, or at most very limited control over it (Anderson 2011). 
The profit motive obviously drives DRM; it also drives other attempts to ensure 
that customers are identified. Recently, MasterCard made a submission to Australian 
regulators in a formal procedure in which the Australian government was trying to 
decide how and whether to regulate BitCoin, a somewhat anonymous payment tech-
nology (Hajdarbegovic 2014). MasterCard made a very strong submission to the Aus-
tralian regulator which said, we are regulated and have to know our customers and 
therefore no one else should be allowed to provide anonymous payment services. 
"[A]ll participants in the payments system that provide similar services to consumers 
should be regulated in the same way to achieve a level playing field for all" (ib.). And 
that level playing field should involve maximal consumer transparency, thus "consum-
er protection, anti-money laundering (AML), counter-terrorist financing (CTF) and sta-
bility should be the cornerstones of any regulation of electronic payments, including 
digital currencies"(ib.). 
MasterCard’s sole proposal was that nobody should have privacy by law, and no 
one should be allowed to offer it. That is a disturbing indicator suggesting that the de-
sire to protect the profit and business models of companies that heavily invested in 
identification technology has set off a race to the bottom in which regulations will be 
invoked to limit competing privacy-enhanced products. One would have much pre-
ferred to see a so-called ‘struggle to the top’ in which firms competed to provide priva-
cy-enhanced products. 
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Indeed, identifying technologies are already widespread. Some are operated at the 
ISP level, some are in telephones, and some operate at the legal level. You cannot talk 
today about any online issue without talking about telephones. Predictions are that 
telephones will be eclipsing PCs very shortly as a means to get online (Standage 2013). 
Telephones come configured as a privacy wasteland. Because the engineering of the 
cell phone network is entirely about identifying the user, your phone is constantly 
providing data about you and that information is used to identify you and link to of-
fline databases. 
In the United States, if a person walks into a store it is perfectly legal for the store 
to detect the wi-fi signal that their phone emits as it tries to connect to a network. That 
signal has a unique identifier. It permits the store to track customers as they move 
around the store, and it links to that record if the customer ever revisits the store. 
Linking the customer to a past purchase may make it possible to send the customer 
advertisements or discount coupons. 
From a strictly pocketbook point of view, this might be a good thing for consumers 
as they get offered a discount. Indeed, this is the method by which most phone-based 
technology, most apps, convince people not to be too concerned. The surveillance is 
sold to consumers as empowering, in the sense that it makes possible the functionality 
of the app. But one need only look at a modern smart phone to see the great breadth 
of the permissions which installed apps require in order to function. It is common on 
installation to see a great mismatch between the permissions that the app asks for and 
what it actually needs to function. On my phone, apps commonly demand to have ac-
cess to my location, even though they are not a name- or location-based service. The 
choice is to take it or leave it. And we take it. And thus there is no privacy if you use 
your phone. 
4 Political drivers of the demise of anonymity 
But it gets worse. If you are using a cell phone, or an old fashioned telephone, or a 
computer, to access the internet, there is probably one – if not several – government-
sponsored data collection devices monitoring your communication. This is one of the 
things we learned from Edward Snowden, and even before him, where people had 
stumbled upon these strange rooms in ISPs company where there were far more com-
puters, recorders and wires than had any right to be there (Hepting 2008; In re NSA 
2008). We know from statistics that came out in the Snowden revelations that as of 
May 2012, US security services and their allies had collected technical information on 
about 70 percent of the cell phone networks in the world. They had data on 701 out of 
985 known cell phone networks (Ferranti 2014). As for the physical undersea cables 
that move communications transnationally, it is believed that every one of those ca-
bles has a tap attached to it (Khazan 2013), which is why some countries now want to 
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build their own undersea cables (Scola 2014), which I interpret, perhaps cynically, to 
mean they want to own the taps. 
The information architectures we use route our information via strange places, 
such as “the cloud”, further undermining our privacy. One could encrypt all one’s data 
so that tapping the cloud would be less useful, but few people do that. And even en-
cryption has become an uncertain friend. This is another thing we have learned from 
the Snowden revelations: that the US National Security Administration (NSA) has 
worked quite hard in two known cases – and, we fear, in others that we don’t know 
about – to weaken encryption standards in a way which makes them easier to break 
(Arthur 2013). These decryption projects still take some computation, but much less 
than would be required if the algorithms had not been engineered to carry hidden de-
fects. The tools meant to protect us and protect our information are no longer reliable. 
It is no longer reasonable to have faith in even those international standard-making 
processes that had been the gold standard for reliable cryptography, because very sub-
tle changes were introduced into these processes via government employees suppos-
edly working independently in a private capacity (The Economist 2013). As investiga-
tors and analysts discover these weaknesses, they propose new and one hopes better 
standards. But that still leaves a large unpatched installed base which can take a long 
time to catch up to the new versions, if indeed they are capable of being patched and 
the new versions are compatible. 
In contrast, sometimes the things that would identify us are put out in the open for 
everyone to see, but that can provoke resistance. An example comes from the Domain 
Name System (DNS), which uses what are called IP numbers. IPv4 is the old system and 
the address space is nearly used up. It has only 232 numbers, or about four billion pos-
sible numbers, which is fewer than the number of people on the planet. The internet is 
in the process of moving to IPv6, which offers us 2128 numbers, which is about 340 de-
cillion, enough in theory to give every person on earth several octillions of IP numbers 
and still have plenty left over (Goldman 2012). The original IPv6 specification for email 
required that every email packet would include the MAC number in the header, 
uniquely identifying the device that sent the packet. As a result, every packet sent 
would be immediately traceable to the device that sent it. This created such a furor 
that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) came out with an alternate, if optional, 
standard which includes privacy enhancements (Narten et al. 2007). 
It remains possible that by going to the public library, or to the university, or to the 
cyber café, one can avoid being linked to a message – so long one does not have to 
show ID to use the public computer, and so long as there is no camera there watching 
who is using the equipment. But today, both government and private security cameras 
are ubiquitous indoors and out, making it nearly impossible to be anonymous offline. 
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5 Self-Surveillance as a driver of the demise of anonymity 
And then there is self-surveillance. Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, all offer opportuni-
ties to sabotage one’s own privacy. Using a decent camera and increasingly accurate of 
facial recognition software, we have now gotten to a point where if you have a Face-
book account, there is a 75% chance that a computer can match a picture taken of you 
to your Facebook account in less than 2 seconds (Acquisti et al. 2014). Not having a 
Facebook account is little protection. If somebody else on Facebook took a picture of 
you and tagged it, it is the same as doing it yourself. 
The public and private data collectors are almost merged outside of the EU, practi-
cally the only place where there are significant limits on data re-use. In the rest of the 
world, and especially in the US, they are all sharing with each other. In the United 
States all sorts of government information, including some disclosures required to ob-
tain certain permits, is for sale. Meanwhile the marketers are selling their data to the 
government, which uses it for ID authentication among other things. In the name of 
national security, the US is also building ever-larger databases, which brings us to the 
world of big data. The internet of things means that we will have all sorts of devices 
that talk to each other on the internet, so your refrigerator will know when you are 
home, it will know what you are eating and it will tell your insurance company about 
your diet. Your life insurance rates will be adjusted according to whether you ingest 
too much cholesterol. 
6 Law and the demise of anonymity 
So where does law fit into all this? The common-law nations have approached the In-
ternet with a three-step procedure. The first step has been to look at some of the ac-
tivity on the internet, like email and electronic documents, and to try to categorize 
those things, or those activities, as akin to something familiar, both because this is how 
lawyers think and because it is less work. 
When that approach failed to cover all the new phenomena, or just could not be 
made to fit because that internet thing was too different, the next step was to create 
new categories or in some cases to create new institutions like ICANN. 
Meanwhile, there was a third step: a bold attempt to turn back the clock. New 
channels of speech, new channels of commerce, and of course new methods of copy-
ing and sharing content, each discomfited and disrupted established practices or 
threatened profitable business models belonging to powerful institutions. In the case 
of law enforcement, common investigative techniques seemed to be at risk. These 
institutions sought to prohibit the new things that endangered the established order. 
For a long time the best example of this was the campaign by Big Copyright for DRM. 
Copyright interests carried out a successful campaign to enact new copyright re-
strictions, to protect against digital technologies, and to get the law to make copyright 
violation an increasingly serious offense (Digital Millennium Act 1998). The loi Hadopi 
From Anonymity to Identification 
130 
was an example of this in France (Dejean et al. 2010), until it was struck down (Conseil 
Constitutionnel 2009), although even then copyright interests secured passage of a 
corrective, known as “Hadopi 2”( Loi 2009-1311 du 28 octobre 2009). 
7 A goldfish bowl society 
The push against anonymity has had even greater success than the push against copy-
right violations. Copyright violations are still ongoing; we need only consider the cases 
of torrent sites, or the notorious Pirate Bay (Cook 2014), to see that. But for those 
seeking to speak anonymously, there really is no place to go. There is more identifica-
tion and more surveillance online – especially through the linking of the online and 
offline – than I think has ever before existed in human history. We have radically over-
compensated. The Internet plus cellphones, plus sensors, equals basically a goldfish 
bowl society, and we are the goldfish. 
The state can use this privacy-compromising technology in all kinds of overt and 
subtle ways. The subtle ones may be worse than the overt ones because people be-
come nervous about doing things, the so-called chilling effect. We have seen examples 
of this in New York City where the police created a Facial Recognition Unit to identify 
suspects – and demonstrators – via Instagram and Facebook (Weis 2013). Ukraine had 
a demonstration recently, and the government set up a fake cell tower – stingray is the 
name of the technology – collecting information on cellphones held by the people in 
the area. It then sent text messages, “Hello, we are the police. Your position has been 
reported and being at an illegal demonstration, just thought you’d like to know we 
know” (Merchant 2014). This is a way of keeping people home. It works. 
In the West, we have used the law to enlist key intermediaries as our identity col-
lectors. Here the template was the banking system, which has for many years been 
subject to “know your customer” rules in which banks and other financial intermediar-
ies must collect information about people before accepting their deposits and pro-
cessing their payments. ISPs, the choke points in the internet ecology, were next. 
There has been a gradual effort to get ISPs to collect as much information about their 
customers, and their customer’s communications, as the cellphone company gathers. 
As is well known, U.S. law has special Constitutional protections for speech (US Consti-
tution Amendment I), and supposedly against government searches (US Constitution 
Amendment IV). It is worth pointing out when you mix the adoption of encryption with 
the legal protection of anonymous speech, it creates a major tension that U.S. law has 
not yet resolved. The legal problem exists because every packet of encrypted digitized 
data looks alike from the outside. If the legal system imagines that there might be any 
class of disfavored and thus unprotected speech, whether it is pirated movies, terrorist 
conspiracies, obscenity, or revenge porn, widespread encryption undermines the abil-
ity to control the spread of that content. And if a key element of that control involves 
finding the party responsible for the bad speech, cryptography-based anonymity tech-
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nology becomes a major problem. The technological measures necessary to be able to 
pierce anonymity must be applied to every packet on the network or it is meaningless. 
Either we allow as much anonymity as users want, or we allow none at all. 
8 Safeguarding anonymity 
Can anonymity online be saved? The question currently makes sense only for comput-
ers, because for cellphones the game is fully lost. To protect identities in the cell phone 
world would take a whole new hardware, a whole new architecture, and given the size 
and value of the installed base and the power of incumbent carriers, one has to ask if 
this is even possible. Even for the world wide web, reclaiming space for real anonymity 
would take many changes. It would take the full encryption of the web transport 
mechanisms (Casaretto 2014).3 It would require the repeal of all laws that enable digi-
tal inspections, in which the government can look inside the packet to tell whether it is 
a bad packet or a good packet. It would require control of ongoing efforts of national 
security agencies to collect and store all the metadata information that describes 
where the packet came from and where it is going. And, crucially, it requires standards 
we can trust. This is the biggest barrier, because that trust requires relying on a math-
ematical expertise that only a small number of people have. 
To make email anonymity real, we would need many things we do not have at pre-
sent. To start, we would need a widely shared encryption tool; in addition we would 
need an infrastructure of remailers, a thing that is quite unlikely for all of the reasons 
mentioned above, notably the spam and the legal risks. 
More generally we would need a deeper and broader understanding of what priva-
cy means and why it matters. Because ultimately the anonymity problem is converging 
with the big data problem: the more that governments and firms place sensors every-
where and collect masses of information about everyone online and off and then use it 
to build profiles about us, the less there is any place to hide. Thus, we must now ask 
whether there are the legal or social solutions to the problem of these profiles. 
9 Data retention 
It is true that on the data retention question alone we have relatively good results, 
especially in the EU. There was a major decision by the European Union Court of Jus-
tice in April 2014 annulling the proposed data retention rules (Digital Rights Ireland 
2014), and it did so on the basis of the European Convention of Human Rights, and on 
case law from the European Court of Human Rights, which importantly opens the 
doors to linking these two sets of law. Henceforth, in the EU data retention cannot be 
general but must be necessary and proportionate. Data collected for one purpose can 
only be re-used for law enforcement if there is a link to a specific threat to public safe-
                                                      
3 Although growing quickly, current https traffic remains a small fraction of total web traffic, being 
only 3.8% in North America in 2014, 6.1% in Europe, and 10.37% in Latin America. 
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ty and the risk of stigmatization stemming from inclusion in the police data basis is 
limited. Either before this decision, or as a result of it, the national courts in many 
countries of the EU have struck down data retention. Many more countries have chal-
lenges pending. 
But outside Europe it is a different story. In Australia, data retention is proceeding 
apace. Indeed outside of Europe and the U.S. we don’t have at the moment mandatory 
data retention, we just have an open door. A number of Latin American countries are 
discussing data retention laws. To the extent that some people look to the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1969), there is a little relevant case law. And then in Asia, and especially in China, there 
tends to be even less scope for anonymity. 
In the United States as a formal matter, we do not have a data retention mandate 
at present. But there is a terribly fictional element to that claim as we have learned 
that our government is already gathering and storing massive amounts of communica-
tions traffic (Ball 2014). 
10 Some unintended consequences of the Snowden revelations 
This brings us to yet another perversity in privacy and security policy. In addition to all 
their positive effects, the Snowden revelations may have two other unanticipated neg-
ative effects. Let me not be misunderstood; so far, the consequences have been posi-
tive. But we need to understand what all the consequences may be. One likely conse-
quence is that a number of governments will now officially make legal what was previ-
ously done secretly. We are already seeing this in Ireland which is setting up a new 
system of surveillance in which ISPs and telephone companies can be required to pro-
vide data to the government and if they are unwilling there is a new secret court to 
make them – in effect creating a whole new judicial system (Lillington 2014). The sec-
ond thing is that we now know that the NSA has been collecting data domestically on a 
large scale. This was a major secret, so much so that it greatly constrained the NSA’s 
willingness to share data with civilian law enforcement authorities although it did not 
completely prevent it (Fakhoury 2013). The NSA apparently feared that information 
about its capabilities and activities might come out in court, and the NSA considered 
this knowledge to be a national secret of too high value to take that risk. 
Now we find ourselves in a different place. We now have evidence that the NSA 
and its companion agencies in several other countries have been capturing communi-
cations and sharing them with each other (Corera 2013). As a result, it seems only logi-
cal that the NSA and other nations’ security agencies too, will become much more will-
ing to share the fruits of their communications acquisition with domestic law enforce-
ment agencies. If and when this comes to pass, privacy actually might become weaker 
as a result of Snowden’s exposure of these surveillance technologies. 
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11 The limited potential of International Human Rights law 
Lawyers naturally wish to find solutions to social problems in the law. After all, if ac-
cess to anonymity is so closely tied to the preservation of autonomy and personal pri-
vacy, and if this problem is indeed global in scope, that sounds as if it should be an in-
ternational human rights problem. Can International Human Rights (IHR) law do the 
job here? Again, I have a rather pessimistic assessment. There is no real sign that IHR 
law provides the tools to address this problem, and if it could, the enforcement mech-
anisms outside the EU are notoriously weak. Although there is some basis in IHR law to 
seek protection for privacy, broadly defined, it is not the same as anonymity and in-
deed it is fairly clear in most of the relevant instruments that anonymity is something 
they wish to exclude from protection. Indeed, a rare clear discussion of the protection 
of anonymity in IHR law is found in the Council of Europe’s Declaration of Freedom of 
Communication on the Internet of 2003 where it says on article 7, principle 7: 
In order to ensure protection against online surveillance and to enhance the free expression of in-
formation and ideas, member states should respect the will of users of the Internet not to disclose 
their identity. This does not prevent member states from taking measures and co-operating in order 
to trace those responsible for criminal acts, in accordance with national law, the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other international agreements in the 
fields of justice and the police (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers 2003). 
So even there, in what is perhaps the high watermark for protection of anonymous 
speech in IHR law, we see major carve-outs and limitations. 
But this is still more than we find in other instruments. Article 19 in the Universal 
Declaration in Human Rights provides that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opin-
ion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers” (UN 1948). Similar protections of communicative freedom appear in 
other important international agreements, for example Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1976), but in every case either implicitly or 
more commonly explicitly the relevant rights are hedged with the idea that ordre 
publique or something similar justifies finding the identity of the speaker – that it is 
important to ensure that communicative freedom is not used for crime. Thus the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for a number of important 
communicative freedoms and then qualifies them by saying that they “may therefore 
be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary” whether for the “respect of the rights or reputations of others” or 
“for the protection of national security or of public order, or public health or morals” 
(ib.; Grisby 2014).4 Those are very broad categories. 
                                                      
4 On November 25, 2014, the third committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that 
calls on states to “respect and protect the right to privacy” in the digital age. Surveillance of digital 
communications “must be conducted on the basis of a legal framework”. The final Report, however, 
removed text from an earlier draft that said surveillance needed to conform with principles of pro-
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The EU idea is better, but only somewhat. The EU seems to believe that large 
amounts of personal data may be collected, but once the data are collected it is possi-
ble to impose limits on reuse. From my pessimistic perspective, proportionality means 
that the information is going to be available, waiting to be analyzed, waiting to be 
used, if a government body finds that there are sufficient grounds to do so. One is 
asked to trust the people holding the information, despite what we have learned from 
Snowden. 
12 Conclusion and outlook 
That trust approach is different from the appeal of anonymity in the strong sense. An-
onymity is a safety valve technology when trust is absent or the future uncertain. In a 
world of increasing surveillance we have never needed that safety valve more than we 
do today. It provides a mechanism, one at present complex and not utterly reliable, 
from which we derive some hope of blocking the growth of profiling, and some hope 
of communicating without it necessarily being traced back to us – because otherwise 
everything can be traced back to us. Neither in domestic law nor in international law 
do we see a strong commitment to anonymous speech at a time when it is so much in 
need of protection. I think that Justice Scalia spoke for many people, particularly those 
in power, when he said he thought there was something fundamentally dishonorable 
about anonymous speech (McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n 1995). 
Many governments simply do not trust their people and are afraid of honest 
speech because it might lead to something revolutionary. Others may not fear revolu-
tion but they fear crime, hate speech, or the theft of intellectual property. So the com-
bination of these things means there is basically no constituency for anonymity at the 
international level nor at the government level other than a few NGOs – but they do 
not get to make national, much less international, law. Add in the bilateral and multi-
lateral trade treaties that often create new protections for intellectual property, and 
recall that many of these protections will require identification in order to be effective. 
The bottom line is that anonymity online is not just in danger, but on life support. 
The plight of online anonymity can no longer be seen as just a technical issue. It is 
political. The anonymity issue is an inextricably interconnected with technical issues 
for the standards for phones and for computers, for apps, for ‘trusted technology’, for 
intellectual property. It is connected to strong market-based incentives because there 
is money to be made from identification and profiling. Anonymity also suffers from its 
connection to very powerful imperatives and bureaucratic incentives in the name of 
national security. 
The anonymity issue has merged into the online privacy issue, and the online priva-
cy issue is merged into the offline privacy issue, and in fact has become just the privacy 
                                                                                                                                                            
portionality, legitimacy, and necessity—principles that are not [explictly] contained in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (ib.). 
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issue with no adjectives. The question therefore is really to what extent consumers 
and voters are going to decide they care about privacy. And the history so far suggests 
that the answer is that they care a little bit, not zero, but not enough to push against 
all the other forces deployed in this arena. I continue to believe that the lack of panic is 
primarily because most people do not truly understand how much they are being sur-
veilled – because surveillance, especially online, remains mostly invisible. I think there 
is still hope; if we can make surveillance more visible, there is hope that enough people 
will get excited about the issue to matter. But this is only a hope and in no way a cer-
tainty. 
In the process of offering anonymity as a response to surveillance, it will be im-
portant to deal with the very legitimate, and if not legitimate certainly honestly and 
deeply felt, concerns of people who think that there is something wrong with anonym-
ity, that it encourages people to be bad. Part of that solution will be to devise other 
ways to deal with the bad things people do online. So, for example, if we had a con-
sensus for ridicule and social ostracism of people who are the sources of revenge porn 
(most of whom will be known to the victims), and also for those who enable them, this 
might help prevent it and reduce the calls for ubiquitous deployment of identification 
technology. 
Although not all is lost yet, realistically one must conclude that the prognosis for 
strong anonymity is fairly grim. I invite you to prepare to enjoy swimming in the digital 
goldfish bowl. 
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